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The British Labour Party and the Antisemitism Crisis:
Jeremy Corbyn and Image Repair Theory
Abstract
This paper utilises the work of William Benoit on image repair theory as a theoretical 
framework for examining the crisis communication of Jeremy Corbyn in relation to 
antisemitism within the Labour Party. By examining the self-defence rhetoric of Corbyn on the 
antisemitism allegations the paper identifies the following. Of the five strategies for crisis 
communication, Corbyn was overly-reliant on denial, evading responsibility and reducing 
offensiveness; struggled to explain his attempts at corrective action; and reverted to accepting 
responsibility – i.e., apologies - reluctantly and belatedly. Utilising existing perspectives on the 
most effective strategies for image repair – which emphasise the importance of effective 
corrective action and accepting responsibility at the expense of denial, evading responsibility 
and reducing effectiveness – the paper argues that Corbyn undermined his own attempts at 
image repair in the crisis that defined his leadership. 
Keywords
Labour Party; Jeremy Corbyn; Political Leadership; Crisis Communication; Antisemitism; 
Image Repair. 

































































This paper contributes to academic debates on antisemitism in the Labour Party under 
Jeremy Corbyn (Hirsh 2018; Rich 2018). The paper utilises Benoit’s image repair theory as a 
theoretical framework for examining the crisis communication that Corbyn used in relation to 
the antisemitism allegations. The rationale for assessing Corbyn via image repair theory is clear 
as the antisemitism crisis caused him significant reputational damage (Barclay et al, 2019).  
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of image repair 
theory. It identifies the different strategies – denial, evading responsibility, reducing 
offensiveness, corrective action and accepting responsibility - alongside examples of 
individuals and organisations who have been evaluated against it; and an assessment of the 
strategies that have been identified as the most effective. The second section identifies the 
competing perspectives in relation to the antisemitism allegations against the Labour Party. 
The third section assesses Corbyn against the strategies outlined within image repair theory, 
before the concluding section summarises the main findings and identifies how and why the 
approach of Corbyn was inappropriate, inconsistent and contradictory. 
Image Repair Theory 
The starting point for image repair theory is when an individual or organisation has 
been accused of wrong doing that causes them reputational damage. The level of reputational 
damage will be shaped by first, the extent to which the individual or organisation is deemed to 
be responsible; and second, the extent to which the accusation is deemed to be offensive. The 
strategy that the accused adopts to limit the damage to their image is goal-orientated behaviour 
designed to alter perceptions – be that consumers in business; fans in the case of celebrities; or 
voters for political parties and politicians (Benoit 1995, 2015). 
































































Image repair theory is recognised as the ‘dominant paradigm’ for assessing crisis 
communication (Dardis and Haigh, 2009: 101). It has been applied to political figures – e.g., 
Presidents Reagan (Benoit et al, 1991); Clinton (Blaney and Benoit, 2001); George W. Bush 
(Benoit and Henson, 2009); Obama (Benoit, 2014) and Trump (Benoit, 2017) – and beyond 
the political sphere in relation to the Queen (Benoit and Brinson, 1999); the actor, Hugh Grant 
(Benoit, 1997); the sportswoman, Tonya Handing (Benoit and Hanczor, 1994); and to corporate 
scandals (Brinson and Benoit, 1999; Benoit and Hirson, 2001). 
What emerges from these studies is how those that are accused of wrong doing need to 
respond in the immediate aftermath of the onset of the crisis, so as to reassure followers that 
the accusation being made is mistaken or exaggerated. This represents a critical moment, for 
at the onset of the crisis there will be, depending upon the severity of the accusation and the 
significance of the individual or organisation involved, a media-driven demand for information. 
Failure on behalf of the accused to respond can create an information vacuum as both 
the media and the public will demand immediate answers and explanations (Coombs, 2007). 
On the question as to whether to respond (rebuttal) or not, there is the risk that silence implies 
culpability, and the information vacuum will be filled by the media. This creates incentives for 
those accused to intervene and seek to minimize or challenge the validity of the accusations 
being made. An effective rebuttal to the allegations being made is one that challengers the 
established interpretation, with an account which enables followers, be they stakeholders, 
customers, voters or fans, to see a counter-argument which amounts to a credible explanation 
in mitigation (Heath, 2006). This represents the opportunity to ‘filter’ and ‘frame’ the message 
so as to potentially reshape public opinion of the accusation (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). 
What image repair theory provides is the strategies and techniques – see table one - for 
those engaging in crisis communication, and these provide the basis upon which the Corbyn 
antisemitism case will be assessed. 
































































Table One: Image Repair Theory
Strategies Techniques 
1. Denial (a). Dispute the existence of a crisis 
(b). Shift the blame in terms of responsibility
2. Evading Responsibility (a). Provocation – a response to another wrong 
(b). Defeasibility – claim a lack of knowledge
(c). Excuses – caused by factors beyond their control
(d). Justification – claim actions based on good intentions
3. Reducing Offensiveness (a). Bolstering – mitigate negative impact of issue by promoting 
positive alternative reputation
(b). Minimisation – imply issue less serious than suggested. 
(c). Differentiation – lessen impact by distinguishing it from 
something more offensive
(d). Transcendence – to place within a broader context and 
construct a less offensive frame of reference.
(e). Attack accuser – to limit the impact of the accusation 
question the credibility of the accuser. 
(f). Compensation – making an offer to those effected to offset 
the reputational damage caused. 
4. Correction Action (a). Initiate change – acknowledge the negativity of the issue and 
move beyond rhetoric towards substantive action to demonstrate 
change. 
5. Accepting Responsibility (a). Apologies – admitting wrong doing. 
 
Sources: adapted from Benoit 1995, 2015.
What have been identified as the most effective and least effective strategies of crisis 
communication? Strategies that are deemed to be more effective are: corrective action 
(demonstrating change) and accepting responsibility (apologies). Strategies that have been 
demonstrated to be less effective are: denial; evading responsibility; and reducing 
offensiveness. Effective image repair demands that the strategies used are a). appropriate for 
the circumstances – e.g., denial is only legitimate if the accusation lacks legitimacy (Coombs, 
2006); b). and consistently applied – i.e., select the optimum strategy and stick to it, and 
































































remember not to select strategies that are contradictory, such as denial and accepting 
responsibility, as apologies are not required if the accusation is unfounded (Benoit and Drew, 
1997; Blaney et al, 2002; Lee, 2004; Pace et al, 2010).
The legitimacy of image repair theory, as a theoretical framework, has been clearly 
demonstrated within studies of American political leadership but what value can it offer in 
terms of how political leaders communicate in British politics? Existing interpretations within 
British politics focus on rhetorical political analysis. This approach identifies how political 
orators construct political debates and persuade others to accept their interpretations via 
appeals to reason, emotion or through the orators’ reputation (see, for example, Crines and 
Hayton, 2015; Hayton and Crines, 2015; Crines et al, 2016). Although illuminating such 
approaches assess overall communication performance, but they do not explicitly focus on 
explaining (in)effectiveness in relation to specific circumstances. The crisis circumstances 
surrounding Labour Party antisemitism make the image repair theory more appropriate than 
rhetorical political analysis. 
Labour Party Antisemitism
The allegations of antisemitism that have been made against the Labour Party, and their 
impacts, are covered extensively elsewhere (Hirsh 2018; Rich 2018). From these studies, it is 
clear that the allegations placed Corbyn in the position of engaging in crisis communication, 
making this a suitable case for analysing via image repair theory.
What was problematic for Corbyn was how the antisemitism allegations were being 
framed in terms of responsibility and offensiveness. On the latter issue of the offensiveness, an 
accusation of racism has to be regarded as serious; after all it has led to the Labour Party being 
investigated by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2019). 
































































With regard to the responsibility for the crisis, it is clear that the focus on antisemitism 
increased after Corbyn won the Labour Party leadership. On the conundrum of how to construct 
a position that does permit legitimate questioning of the conduct of Israel, but does not permit 
antisemitic stigmatisation, it was alleged that Corbyn had, via his rhetoric, positions and 
associations, strayed into the latter categorisation. On his election to the party leadership critics 
argued that Labour was now ‘led by an antizionist’ who had ‘jumped to the defence of 
antisemites’ (Hirsh, 2018: 66). 
We also need to acknowledge the fact that thereafter, Labour Party members, activists 
and occasionally even representatives, were exposed as having engaged in behaviours, often 
disseminated via social media, that could be construed as antisemitic (Allington, 2019). Media 
coverage on the issue would increase after the comments of Ken Livingstone, former Labour 
Mayor of London, in an interview in April 2016 (BBC, 2016). When Livingstone implied a 
correlation between Zionism and Nazism, a video recording of Labour MP, John Mann, calling 
Livingstone a ‘disgusting racist’ went viral on social media, and a peripheral issue moved into 
the mainstream (Hirsh, 2018: 18). 
During Corbyn’s leadership tenure the Labour Party would suffer the consequences of 
the ongoing antisemitism crisis, and for this he, as party leader, would be deemed responsible. 
For example, by July 2019, 42 percent of voters thought antisemitism within the Labour Party 
was a genuine and serious issue; 33 percent thought the Labour Party was an antisemitic party; 
and 49 percent thought that Corbyn should be doing more to address the issue (Savage and 
Helm, 2019).  When we isolate this to its impact upon Jewish voters, evidence emerged of a 
‘distinctive negative Corbyn effect on Jewish voter support for Labour since 2015’ as ‘Labour 
candidates standing in areas of substantial Jewish communities’ performed worse than they 
had before he was party leader (Barclay et al, 2019). Antisemitism was also identified as a 
contributing factor amongst eleven Labour parliamentarians who would resign the Labour 
































































whip: one of them, Luciana Berger, lamented that the party had become ‘institutionally 
antisemitic’ (Marsh, 2019). 
However, these observations have to be placed within the context of the following 
considerations: 
(a) Disagreements exist on the line between legitimate and illegitimate discussion about 
the behaviours of Israel and that the charge of antisemitism could be used as a means 
of silencing criticism of Israeli (Philo and Berry, 2019a: 23-44).
(b) That the Jewish community does not speak with one voice. Critiques of Corbyn 
have been articulated effectively by the Jewish Labour Movement. However, some 
Jewish groups, such as the Jewish Voice for Labour, have challenged the notion of left 
antisemitism, arguing that they are conflating antizionism with antisemitism to 
undermine Corbyn (Rich, 2018).
(c). The issue could have been exploited by opponents of Corbyn within the Labour 
Party, to undermine his leadershipii (Johnson, 2019). 
(d). The issue could have been exaggerated within the media coverage (Schlosberg and 
Laker, 2018). 
The impact of this was clear: although only 0.1 percent of Labour Party members were 
actually under investigation for allegations of antisemitism (early 2019), research showed that 
voters estimated that the figure was somewhere between 25 to 40 percent. On this ‘disparity’, 
Philo and Berry argue that this stems from the following amplifying effect: between June 2015 
and March 2019 the print media ran 5,497 stories on the Labour Party and antisemitism, which 
triggered further coverage on television and social media, which then created a distorted 
perception of the scale of the problem (Philo and Berry, 2019b).
































































For Corbyn, and his allies, the problem was not just that the issue was being exaggerated 
but that it was an accusation that, to them, seemed oxymoronic. They subscribed to the view 
that left-wing antisemitism could not exist, as ‘by definition there can be no antisemitism within 
the community of the progressive’ (Hirsh, 2018: 38). That created the conundrum for Corbyn, 
and his supporters, of having to defend his reputation against an invalid allegation – i.e., a 
smear (Gidley et al, 2020: 413). 
Corbyn’s Crisis Communication 
The analysis below identifies the following in relation to Corbyn’s crisis 
communication: first, his instinctive tendency towards denial, evading responsibility and 
reducing offensiveness; second, his misplaced attempts at corrective action; and third, his 
attitude towards accepting responsibility. 
Denial, Evading Responsibility and Reducing Offensiveness 
Corbyn instinctively challenged the legitimacy of the allegations being made. An early 
example of this would be the case of the Labour peer, Michael Levy, when he criticised Corbyn 
over antisemitism. Corbyn went on Sky News and accused Levy of not ‘listening’ and failing 
to note that ‘I’ve absolutely condemned antisemitism; I’ve condemned Islamophobia, I’ve 
condemned any form of racism anywhere within our society’ (Corbyn, 2016a). Here Corbyn 
utilised denial: he suggests that he personally could not be associated with antisemitism as a 
means by which to dispute the accusations being made and their potentially negative impact 
upon his reputation. 
































































He also decided not to condemn antisemitism in isolation (the reducing offensiveness 
technique of transcendence by placing the issue in a broader and less offensive frame of 
reference). He listed his condemnation of antisemitism alongside his condemnation of all forms 
of racism, which made the accusation less plausible, given his widely acknowledged reputation 
as an anti-racist campaigner (Home Affairs Select Committee Report on Antisemitism, 2016: 
44). This constituted the reducing effectiveness technique of bolstering your reputation as a 
means to mitigate the potentially negative impacts that the accusation could carry (as well as 
the evading responsibility technique of justifications). 
He also did this by focusing on the reputation of the Labour Party for equality, as he 
identified that ‘we are the party that introduced the first Race Relations Act…  we are the party 
that introduced the Human Rights Act…[and]… we are the party that introduced the Equalities 
Act.  (Corbyn, 2016a). Corbyn would repeatedly rely on this technique of bolstering in 
conference speeches and parliamentary debates. For example, he informed conference that 
‘ours is the party of equality for all’ and we have ‘pioneered every progressive initiative to root 
out racism from our society’ (Corbyn, 2018a). At Prime Minister’s Questions he attacked 
Theresa May by pointing out how the Labour Party was the ‘first to introduce anti-racist 
legislation into law in Britain’, because ‘we totally oppose racism in any form whatsoever’ (HC 
Deb, Vol. 663, Col. 826, 17 July 2019). 
His denial was personal and political. To dispute the claim that he was antisemitic he 
emphasised how the Labour Party was ‘built on the values of solidarity, social justice, equality 
and human rights’ and ‘that is why I have devoted my life to it’ (Corbyn, 2016b). This method 
to dispute the allegations was still being utilised by the time of the Labour Party Annual 
Conference two years later, as he argued that ‘anti-racism is integral to our very being… it is 
part of who you all are and it is part of who I am.’ (Corbyn, 2018a). Corbyn also explicitly 
rejected the personal allegations against him. During the Labour Party leadership election of 
































































2015, he argued that ‘the idea that I am some kind of racist or antisemitic person is beyond 
appalling, disgusting and deeply offensive’ (BBC, 2015). 
The Corbyn strategy also involved minimisation. If pressed to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the antisemitism allegations, Corbyn would talk about how it involved a ‘very, 
very, very small number of cases’ (Corbyn, 2016a). To get this point across he would identify 
how ‘the number represents less than 0.1 percent of Labour’s membership of more than half a 
million’ (Corbyn, 2018b). He still relied on minimisation during the General Election campaign 
of 2019 as he stated how it applied to a ‘a very, very small number of people’ of the membership 
(BBC, 2019a).
Corbyn repeatedly used the technique of transcendence, by placing the specific 
allegation within a broader context in order to construct a less offensive frame of reference. He 
would emphasise how ‘antisemitism is there in society’ (BBC, 2019a). It could be argued that 
this form of disassociation could be seen as being linked to the Benoit technique of excuses – 
i.e., this is a problem beyond the confines of the Labour Party. This allowed Corbyn to shift 
the emphasis from the specific accusation about antisemitism within the Labour Party, to wider 
problems that allowed him to accuse others. For example, 
‘Race hate is a growing threat that has to be confronted. Not just here in Britain, but 
across Europe and the United States. The far right is on the rise, blaming minorities, 
Jews, Muslims and migrants, for the failures of a broken economic system’ (Corbyn, 
2018a). 
Placing antisemitism as a wider societal problem served three objectives for Corbyn. 
First, it aided his attempts at minimisation as it identified how the problem was not specific to 
the Labour Party. Second, it allowed him to switch the discussion onto economic considerations 
































































and the inequalities within the current economic system, which played to his political base. 
Third, it created space for him to rhetorically change the parameters of debate. It provided the 
opportunity for what Benoit defined as differentiation – Corbyn could lessen the impact of the 
antisemitism allegations by comparing it with something that might be more offensive (e.g., 
the prejudices associated with the far-right).
This created the space for Corbyn to rhetorically counter-attack. He called the 
Conservatives ‘hypocrites’ when they ‘accuse us of antisemitism’ (Corbyn, 2018a). He argued 
that the Conservatives had created a ‘hostile environment for all migrant communities’ due to 
their ‘nasty, cynical politics’ and how their ‘victims include the Windrush generation who 
helped rebuild Britain after the war and were thrown under the bus by a Government that 
reckoned there were votes to be had by pandering to prejudice’ (Corbyn, 2018a). He could then 
unite his party by identifying that the Conservatives had ‘received a letter from the antisemitic 
and Islamophobic Hungarian government, thanking them for their solidarity, just as the rest of 
Europe united against it’ (Corbyn, 2018a). Corbyn could then focus in on how Labour ‘will 
never stay silent in the face of growing Islamophobia, whether from the far right on the streets, 
or the former Foreign Secretary’s [Boris Johnson] disgraceful dog-whistle jibes at Muslim 
women’ (Corbyn, 2018a). Citing the scale of the problem within the Conservative Party also 
formed part of Corbyn’s approach. In his final parliamentary exchange with May he criticised 
her failure to ‘act on Islamophobia in her own party’ and noted how ‘sixty percent of Tory 
party members think Islam is a threat to western civilisation’ (HC Deb, Vol. 633, Col. 826, 17 
July 2019).  When Johnson replaced May as Conservative Party leader, and Prime Minister, 
Corbyn could develop this line of attack. He argued that ‘displays of racism, Islamophobia or 
antisemitism are not signs of strength, but of weakness’ and it was clear that when Johnson 
‘compared Muslim women to letterboxes or bank robbers, it wasn’t a flippant comment, it was 
calculated to play on people’s fears (Corbyn, 2019a). 
































































Identifying Islamophobia, and rhetorically located antisemitism alongside this and the 
broader issues of racism, worked effectively for Corbyn when dealing with accusations from 
Conservatives. He knew that Corbynites would be comfortable attacking the Conservatives, so 
he questioned the legitimacy of the accusations being made: e.g., ‘other political parties and 
some of the media exaggerate and distort the scale of the problem in our party’ (Corbyn, 
2019b). 
Attacking his accusers within the mainstream media – whom Corbynites were 
instinctively hostile to (Cammaerts et al, 2020) – was a rhetorical technique that Corbyn was 
comfortable utilising. For example, when questioned on Channel Four news about his 
association with Hamas and Hezbollah, Corbyn attacked the interviewer, Krishnan Guru-
Murthy, accusing him of ‘trying to trivialise the whole discussion’ given that ‘Hamas and 
Hezbollah are part of a peace process’, before ending the interview with ‘thanks for the tabloid 
journalism’ (Channel Four News, 2015). 
Politically it was more complex for Corbyn when fending off criticism of his leadership 
vis-à-vis antisemitism from within the Labour Party or from Jewish community leaders. With 
regard to the criticism made by Levy, Corbyn expressed how he was ‘disappointed that Lord 
Levy has made these remarks’, because ‘he knows full well what my views are. He knows full 
well what the views of the Labour Party are. He knows full well the kind of decent inclusive 
society that we all want to live in.  I look forward to having that discussion with him (Corbyn, 
2016a). Corbyn also used the issue of wanting to hold a one-to-one consultation with his 
accusers during the General Election campaign of 2019, when Corbyn was criticised by the 
Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis. The Chief Rabbi had argued that a ‘new poison’ of antisemitism 
had taken root in Labour and had been sanctioned by Corbyn – indirectly due to his failures of 
leadership (Stubley, 2019). The same rhetorical deflection technique that he used with Levy 
was deployed in response to the accusations of the Chief Rabbi, as Corbyn argued that: ‘I am 
































































looking forward to having a discussion with him because I want to hear why he would say such 
a thing’ (BBC, 2019a).  
Corrective Action 
Corbyn clearly deployed some of the techniques associated with the Benoit typology in 
relation to denial, evading responsibility and reducing offensiveness. His attempts at repairing 
his own political image on this were undermined, however, by his failings in relation to 
corrective action or initiating change. In terms of actions we can analyse Corbyn in relation to 
the following interventions: first, the failure of the Chakrabarti Inquiry of 2016 to quell the 
crisis over the long-term; second, the mismanagement associated with the adoption of the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism in 2018; 
and third, the accusation that Corbyn displayed a lack of leadership in terms of tightening up 
the procedures covering suspensions and expulsions for members engaging in antisemitic 
behaviour. 
The first corrective action that Corbyn engaged in was setting up the Chakrabarti 
Inquiry. Although this represented a sensible political manoeuvre it failed to quell the furore 
over antisemitism, for a number of reasons, some of which Corbyn can be criticised for. It 
could be argued that the terms of reference for the inquiry were problematic to those who had 
doubts about Corbyn on the issue of antisemitism. Corbyn decided that the inquiry should 
examine antisemitism and ‘other racisms’ within the Labour Party. Framing the parameters of 
the inquiry around other racisms was unusual as there were no allegations within the Labour 
Party around racism generally - it was just specific to antisemitism (Hirsh, 2018: 83). It could 
also be argued that the appointment of the chair of the inquiry, Shami Chakrabarti, was 
problematic and post-inquiry developments undermined the legitimacy of her report. She did 
































































not appear to be a ‘neutral’iii figure who was positioned ‘between those denying antisemitism’ 
and ‘those saying that there was a problem with antisemitism within the Labour Party’ (Hirsh, 
2018: 92). Another limitation with the Chakrabarti Inquiry, however, was the scepticism about 
the main findings of the report, amongst those who had been victims of antisemitism. Although 
a series of recommendations were made, covering offensive language and tightening up 
disciplinary procedures, the media coverage focused on the conclusions that Labour was ‘not 
overrun by antisemitism or other forms of racism’, although there was an ‘occasional toxic 
atmosphere’ and some ‘ignorant attitudes’ (Chakrabarti, 2016: 1). 
However, one of the most problematic aspects of the Chakrabarti inquiry was the way 
in which it was presented by Corbyn in his speech to coincide with the launch of the inquiry’s 
findings. This was despite the fact that much of what Corbyn argued was not controversial, for 
example: ‘racism is racism, there is no hierarchy, no acceptable form of it’ (Corbyn, 2016b). 
He also recognised the legitimacy of the concerns that were being expressed: 
‘I do not believe in name calling and I never have. “Zio” is a vile epithet that follows 
in a long line of earlier such terms that have no place in our Party. Nor should anyone 
indulge in the kind of stereotyping that can cause such hurt and harm. To assume that 
a Jewish friend or fellow member is wealthy, part of some kind of financial or media 
conspiracy, or takes a particular position on politics in general, or on Israel and 
Palestine in particular, is just wrong’ (Corbyn, 2016b). 
In an attempt to ensure that the distinction between legitimate debate and illegitimate 
behaviour, Corbyn was clear as he arguing that: 
































































‘We, as Labour Party members, must all be free to criticise and oppose injustice and 
abuse wherever we find it. But as today's Report recommends, can we please leave 
Hitler and Nazi metaphors alone, especially in the context of Israel’ (Corbyn, 2016b) 
However, the validity of this argument, as a form of corrective action, was to be 
drowned out by the following comparison that Corbyn made: 
‘Our Jewish friends are no more responsible for the actions of Israel or the Netanyahu 
Government than our Muslim friends are for those of various self-styled Islamic states 
or organisations’ (Corbyn, 2016b). 
The report had made it clear that comparing Israel with the Nazis was unacceptable and 
would not be permitted. In seeking to endorse the report Corbyn was engaging in Israeli 
comparisons, albeit not with the Nazis. Instead, Corbyn was drawing an ‘inflammatory 
analogy’ between Israel and ISIS – ‘the closest contemporary equivalent to the Nazis’ in terms 
of their ‘genocidal antisemitism’ (Hirsh, 2018: 88). 
Ultimately, however, the Chakrabarti inquiry failed to fully engage with (a) how a 
culture of hostility towards Israel could manifest itself in members articulating antisemitic 
positions; (b) how to overcome issues of denial amongst members who dispute that their 
behaviours could be construed as antisemitic; and (c). the idea of adopting in full the 
McPherson principle – i.e., that an antisemitic incident requiring investigation is one in which 
the victim perceives that the action was antisemitic (Hirsh, 2018: 85). 
Corbyn can also be open to criticism in terms of how the Labour Party handled the issue 
of accepting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of 
antisemitismiv. An inter-governmental organisation made up of representatives from thirty-one 
































































member nations, the IHRA had formally adopted a working definition of antisemitism in 2016, 
which was accepted by the UK Government. In 2018 the Labour Party formally adopted the 
definition, but only after considerable infighting over whether they should adopt (or amend) 
the eleven examples of antisemitism (Lerman, 2019). 
The official position of the leadership was that their proposed amendments were 
designed to (a) strengthen the definitions and (b) aid their disciplinary processes in relation to 
accusations of antisemitism by members. The rationale for doing so stemmed from the 
argument that the IHRA definition was too vague and imprecise, and thus the leadership’s 
motives were good (Lerman, 2019). That claim was disputed by mainstream representatives of 
the Jewish community who felt that the proposed amendments were being imposed without 
consultation (Schlosberg and Laker, 2018: 5). Of crucial importance was the following 
distinction. The IHRA definition was clear in that it stated that ‘denying the Jewish people their 
right to self-determination – e.g., by claiming that the existence of the State of Israel was a 
racist endeavour’. Alongside this, however, the Labour leadership wanted to insert a longer 
clause that stated that it was not racist to discuss ‘the circumstances of the foundation of the 
Israeli state, for example, in the context of its impact upon the Palestinian people, including 
critical comment upon the differential impact of Israeli laws or policies on different people 
within its population or that of neighbouring territories’ (Kogan, 2019: 350-1). Corbyn would 
claim that was 
‘to make sure there can be open and proper debate about Israel and its foreign policy, 
and about the future for Palestinian people. Hence there has to be that space for debate, 
you cannot shut that down. But it can never, ever be conducted in an anti-Semitic way’ 
(Corbyn, 2018c) 
































































In July 2018, the PLP voted overwhelmingly to embrace the original definition and 
examples set out by the IHRA, whereupon the National Executive Committee (NEC) voted to 
approve the leadership approved amendments, but offered to engage in new consultations with 
the Jewish community (Kogan, 2019: 357). A joint frontpage editorial from The Jewish 
Chronicle, Jewish News and Jewish Telegraph indicated their distrust with the Corbyn 
leadership: they spoke of the ‘existential threat to Jewish life in this country that would be 
posed by a Corbyn led government’ (Watts, 2018). Faced with such an explicit threat to his 
image and thereby his electability, Corbyn responded with: 
‘I do not for one moment accept that a Labour government would represent any kind of 
threat, let alone an ‘existential threat’ to Jewish life in Britain, as three Jewish 
newspapers recently claimed. This is the kind of overheated rhetoric that can surface 
during emotional political debates’ (Corbyn, 2018b). 
That Corbyn issued this response indicated the difficulties that he was experiencing in 
terms of corrective action. As such he was falling back into techniques associated with denial 
– ‘I do not for one moment accept’ – and minimization – ‘overheated rhetoric’. Corbyn also 
sought to distance himself from online antisemitic conduct by shifting the blame: 
‘People who dish out antisemitic poison need to understand: you do not do it in my 
name. You are not my supporters and have no place in our movement’ (Corbyn, 2018b).
Ultimately, however, with the PLP backing the original IHRA definition and examples 
in full, the NEC backed down without a formal vote. Corbyn had engaged in a self-defeating 
exercise – i.e., he had sought to amend the proposed IHRA definitions and examples, and in 
































































failing to secure his objectives had further alienated sections of the Jewish community and 
critics within his own parliamentary ranks; whilst ensuring that the media continued to fixate 
on framing antisemitism in the Labour Party as a problem caused by ineffective leadership. 
Running parallel to criticism of Corbyn vis-à-vis the adoption of the IHRA definition 
and examples was criticism about how complaints against Labour Party members were being 
processed. The official data on complaints indicated that the scale of antisemitism within the 
Labour Party was indeed very low (at 0.1 percent of the membership) as Corbyn would 
continue to mention. However, such claims were undermined by relentless negative publicity 
about how slow their disciplinary systems were at processing complaints, followed on by 
whistleblower complaints by disaffected employees about the institutional failings within the 
party in addressing antisemitism (BBC, 2019a). This crowded out any coverage of the 
corrective action that Corbyn was initiating to trying to address the crisis – for example, how 
they launched an education programme for their membership to understand, confront and 
overcome antisemitism (Labour Party, 2019). 
What also undermined Corbyn vis-à-vis the disciplinary process was the perceived gap 
between his rhetorical claims and the evidence of change. Corbyn was persistent in claims that 
‘all allegations are properly and thoroughly investigated’, and that we ‘take action’ and the idea 
that there was any ‘tolerance of any form of racism is wholly and totally fallacious’ (Corbyn, 
2016a). Despite mounting criticism Corbyn stuck rigidly to this line. During the ITV Leaders 
Debate in the General Election of 2019, Corbyn stated how ‘I have taken action in my party’, 
and ‘when anyone has committed any antisemitic acts or made any antisemitic statements, they 
are either suspended or expelled from the party and we have investigated every single case’ 
(ITV, 2019a). As an exercise in image restoration the problem with the claim was it was 
disputed: the Jewish Labour Movement called it a ‘lie’ as ‘130 outstanding antisemitism cases, 
some dating back years, still haven’t been dealt with’ (Harpin, 2019). 

































































The inability of Corbyn to quell the antisemitism crisis, alongside the personalised 
nature of that criticism, would repeatedly place him in the position of being asked to explain 
himself. These expectations can be said to relate to the final rhetorical technique within crisis 
communication and image restoration – i.e., accepting responsibility and admitting wrong 
doing and offering apologies. 
However, although resistant to the idea of apologising the level of internal pressure 
within the party would force Corbyn to acknowledge the scale of the antisemitism crisis 
(Pogrund and Maguire, 2020: 99-127; 357). This was evident from his speech to conference 
delegates in 2019: 
‘The worst cases of antisemitism in our party have included Holocaust denial, crude 
Jewish-banker stereotypes, conspiracy theories blaming Israel for 9/11 or every war on 
the Rothschild family, and even one member who appeared to believe that Hitler had 
been misunderstood. I am sorry for the hurt that has been caused to many Jewish people. 
We have been too slow in processing disciplinary cases of mostly online antisemitic 
abuse by party members. We are acting to speed this process up’ (Corbyn, 2019a).
However, his apology did not have desired effect due to the following factors: the delay 
in making a fulsome apology; the times prior to this when he has been forced to explain away 
his own prior conduct and rhetoric and avoided a formal apology; and the fact that in interviews 
(not speeches) he came across as offering grudging apologies. 
































































His unconvincing responses helped to sustain the critique of him and his party vis-à-vis 
antisemitism. For example, he struggled to explain away why invited to Parliament 
representatives of Hamas and Hezbollah (in 2009) and described them as ‘friends’ (Corbyn, 
2009). When asked by David Cameron to withdraw the remark that he was ‘friends’ with a 
‘terrorist group who believe in killing Jews’, Corbyn could not bring himself to apologise, 
choosing instead to argue that ‘I was hosting to try to promote a peace process. It was not an 
approval of those organisations’ (HC Deb, Vol. 609, Col. 162, 4 May 2016). Later, when 
questioned in a Home Affairs Select Committee, as to whether he still regarded Hamas and 
Hezbollah as ‘friends’, Corbyn admitted that: ‘the language I used at that meeting was about 
encouraging there to be a discussion about the peace process’ but on reflection, ‘it was inclusive 
language I used which with hindsight I would rather not have used. I regret using those words, 
of course’, (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 2016). Built into his 
rhetorical defence was the Benoit technique of evading responsibility by relying on 
justifications (i.e., good intentions) - for example, ‘in the past, in pursuit of justice for the 
Palestinian people and peace in Israel/Palestine, I have on occasion appeared on platforms with 
people whose views I completely reject’ (ITV, 2018). 
What was becoming increasingly evident was that Corbyn was being undermined by 
his actions and rhetoric from before he became party leader. This was an issue that he openly 
acknowledged as, for example, he said ‘I am now more careful with how I might use the term 
‘Zionist’ because a once self-identifying political term has been increasingly hijacked by 
antisemites as code for Jews’ (BBC, 2018a). 
Corbyn was also placed on the defensive about the fact that he had questioned, on the 
grounds of free speech, the removal of a mural by a graffiti artist in his constituency (Gabor, 
2020: 72). The mural seemed to be antisemitic because it embraced the conspiracy motifs of 
big nosed Jewish bankers securing their wealth at the expense of exploited workers. When 
































































questioned Corbyn responded using a form of the evading responsibility technique of 
defeasibility (lack of knowledge) as he said: ‘I sincerely regret that I did not look more closely 
at the image I was commenting on, the contents of which are deeply disturbing and antisemitic’ 
(BBC, 2018b). 
Corbyn was also on the defensive when the media re-released a picture of him attending 
a wreath laying ceremony in Tunisia (from 2014) commemorating the victims of Israeli 
airstrikes back in 1985. This ceremony was at the cemetery containing the graves of members 
of the Black September Organization, who were responsible for the deaths of Israeli athletes 
attending the 1972 Munich Olympics. This again placed Corbyn on the defensive. He explained 
his conduct via the evading responsibility technique of justifications (good intentions), arguing 
that: 
‘I was there because I wanted to see a fitting memorial to everyone who has died in 
every terrorist incident everywhere because we have to end it…[as]… you cannot 
pursue peace by a cycle of violence; the only way you can pursue peace is by a cycle 
of dialogue’ (BBC, 2018c). 
His subsequent defence that ‘I was present at the wreath-laying [but] I don’t think I was 
actually involved in it’ (BBC 2018c) was another example of the evading responsibility 
technique of defeasibility (lack of knowledge). It provoked widespread incredulity, and on the 
cumulative impact of these repeated accusations, Kogan concluded that: 
‘Corbyn’s ability to ignore unpleasant facts about websites, online supporters, attendees 
at conferences and other places where his name had been freely used [can] no longer 
be accepted as pure naivety’ (Kogan, 2019: 362).  
































































Corbyn was at his least effective during the course of a television interview with 
Andrew Neil in the 2019 General Election campaign (Gabor, 2020: 70). He compounded his 
difficulties by failing to respond directly to a request to apologise for failing to effectively 
address antisemitism within Labour: 
Neil: Wouldn’t you like to take this opportunity tonight to apologise to the British 
Jewish community for what’s happened?
Corbyn: What I’ll say is this. I am determined that our society will be safe for people 
of all faiths. I don’t want anyone to be feeling insecure in our society and our 
government will protect every community 
Neil: So, no apology?
Corbyn: …against the abuse they receive on the streets, on the trains or in any – 
Neil: So, no apology for how you’ve handled this?
Corbyn: …. or any other form of life.
Neil: I will try one more time. No apology?
Corbyn: No, hang on a minute, Andrew. Can I explain what we are trying to do?
Neil: You have and you have been given plenty of time to do that. I asked you if you 
wanted to apologise and you have not (BBC, 2019a). 
Corbyn’s unwillingness to offer an immediate apology ensured that a media frenzy 
about antisemitism derailed their attempts to focus on other campaigning issues (Pogrund and 
Maguire, 2020: 323). In an attempt to overcome this, Corbyn then offered his ‘sympathies and 
apologies’ to the victims of antisemitism within the Labour Party, before reassuring them that 
he would lead the ‘most anti-racist government you’ve ever seen’ (ITV, 2019b). The outcome 
































































of the General Election of 2019, however, would deny Corbyn the opportunity to demonstrate 
this. 
Conclusion
From the above analysis five questions emerge. First, to what extent was the accusation 
legitimate? Second, to what extent was he responsible for the accusation? Third, what was the 
optimal strategy to deploy in the circumstances? Fourth, was his approach to self-defence crisis 
communication consistently applied? And, finally, were there any contradictions in the 
approach that Corbyn relied upon? 
On the first question of the legitimacy of the accusation made it is important to 
remember that denial is an appropriate strategy to utilise if the accusation is illegitimate, but is 
an unwise strategy if the accusation carries some legitimacy (Coombs, 2006). So, was the 
antisemitism accusation legitimate? There is a danger of oversimplifying and creating the two 
extremes of a). antisemitism does not exist and is a smear, the denialists position held by many 
Labour Party members (Gidley, 2020: 411-4) or b). antisemitism does exist and on a wide 
scale, the maximum critique argument pushed by some within the mainstream media, 
(Schlosberg and Laker, 2018). It does exist, albeit on a relatively small scale, but enough to 
become politically significant – and for reasons of self-interest, the critics of Corbyn identified 
it as his area of greatest vulnerability (Gidley et al, 2020: 411-5). 
On the second question of whether he was responsible we can acknowledge that leftish 
antisemitism predates his tenure as leader of the Labour Party (Johnson, 2016). However, that 
minority who held antisemitic views within the left were emboldened by the election of 
Corbyn, giving them a disproportionate voice, which distorted perceptions on the scale of the 
problem. His selection gave them permission to be heard, but this also incentivised his 
































































opponents to draw attention to the antisemitism behaviours of those on the left. Combine this 
with the rhetoric and choices of Corbyn prior to 2015 then he carries a degree of responsibility 
(Gidley et al, 2020: 411-5; Hirsh 2018; Rich 2018).
On the third question of what was the optimal approach to deploy in these 
circumstances then prior image repair research suggests that Corbyn should have been a). 
moved quickly to a dual strategy of corrective action and accepting responsibility, and b). 
avoided relying on denial; evading responsibility or reducing offensiveness, which would be 
less effective (Benoit and Drew, 1997; Lee, 2004; Blaney et al, 2002; Pace et al, 2010).  
On the fourth question it is clear that Corbyn deployed an inconsistent approach which 
can be summarised as follows: 
(a). In the early to mid-part of his leadership tenure, Corbyn clearly displayed a 
tendency towards denial, evading responsibility and reducing offensiveness. Notable 
amongst his rhetorical techniques were excuses, justifications, bolstering, minimisation, 
differentiation, transcendence and attacking accusers. However, given that these 
allegations did carry some legitimacy these were suboptimal strategies to adopt.
(b). Throughout his leadership tenure, Corbyn did engage in forms of corrective action 
– one of the two more effective means of image repair. However, the effectiveness of 
his attempts to demonstrate change was limited. For example, his maladroit handling 
of both the Chakrabarti inquiry launch and the debates about adopting the IHRA 
definition of antisemitism, enabled his critics to construct a narrative of leadership 
failure vis-à-vis his interventions. Moreover, Corbyn struggled to get across the benefits 
of the disciplinary and educational reforms that he was initiating to address the problem. 
































































(c). In the first two-thirds of his leadership tenure, Corbyn displayed an aversion to the 
other most effective means of image repair – i.e., accepting responsibility and offering 
apologies. 
Not only were the strategies that Corbyn adopted in terms of his crisis communication, 
in the period between 2015 and 2018, suboptimal, but they ran parallel to the growing intensity 
of the antisemitism crisis. It could be argued that as the initial wave of allegations unfolded, 
that calling the Chakrabarti Inquiry did help to buy Corbyn some political time.  This ensured 
that it was not such a dominant issue in the General Election campaign of 2017 (Goes, 2018). 
The persistence with which the opponents of Corbyn ensured that antisemitism remained an 
issue after the General Election of 2017, demonstrated not just that the corrective action of the 
Chakrabarti Inquiry would not be enough, but that his ongoing preference for denial, evading 
responsibility and reducing offensiveness was misplaced. The intensification of the 
antisemitism crisis forced Corbyn to alter his approach by late 2018. He did begin to accept 
some responsibility. He admitted that: ‘we were too slow in processing disciplinary cases’ and 
that ‘we haven’t done enough to foster a deeper understanding of antisemitism among 
members’ (Corbyn, 2018b). He also acknowledged that ‘trust between our party and the 
[Jewish] community [was] at a low ebb’ and he committed himself to ‘driving antisemitism 
out of our party for good, and rebuilding that trust’ (Corbyn, 2018b). 
By relying for too long on the suboptimal strategies of denial, evading responsibility 
and reducing offensiveness, and then mismanaging his attempts at corrective action, this meant 
that by the time he did move towards accepting responsibility, the reputational damage was 
done. Polling in the lead up to the General Election of 2019 demonstrated that voters thought 
that Corbyn had (a) denied the allegations, even though this was no longer entirely accurate; 
































































and (b) that he had failed to apologise for the allegations, even though eventually he did (Philo 
and Berry, 2019b). 
On the fifth question it is clear that Corbyn undermined himself further by the 
incompatibility that existed between the strategies that he relied upon. Using denial, as he did, 
but then gravitating to corrective action and eventually acceptability responsibility – shows the 
importance of the combination of strategies that those who are accused of wrong-doing rely 
upon – see Blaney et al, 2002; Drumheller and Benoit, 2004. How could Corbyn expect to 
secure image repair if he eventually, but reluctantly and when under pressure, accepted 
responsibility for the impacts of an accusation that he had repeatedly denied. Moving from one 
self-defence strategy to another, and strategies that were incompatible with each other, 
conveyed a contradictory message and undermined his ability to limit the reputational damage 
upon himself and the Labour Party. This amounts to a failure in crisis communication, and thus 
image repair, that validates the claim by Goodall that this was a crisis that ‘could have been 
shut down and isolated [but] became bigger’ because ‘of the ham-fisted handling’ of ‘the 
leadership’ (Goodall, 2018: 204).
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i Johnson argues that legitimate criticism of Israeli policy can ‘include criticism of the 
occupation of the territories, the settlement project, aspects of the treatment of minorities in 
Israel, and the degree of force Israel uses to restore deterrence against Hamas’, as opposed to 
‘illegitimate discourse, which uses demonising, dehumanising and conspiracist language to 
bend the meaning of ‘Israel’ and ‘Zionism’ and ‘Zionists’ so far out of shape that each term 
becomes a fit receptacle for the tropes, images and ideas of classical antisemitism’ (Johnson, 
2019: 21). Antisemitism ‘dressed up’ as antizionism comprises: ‘a political programme to 
abolish the Jewish homeland (and no other homeland); a discourse to demonise it as evil and 
‘Nazi’ (and only it); and a movement to make it a global pariah state’ (Johnson, 2019: 21).
ii The leaked report on the work of the Labour Party’s Governance and Legal Unit, who handled 
the disciplinary cases relating to antisemitism suggested that internal party critics of Corbyn 
were obstructionist and undermined attempts to deal with antisemitism allegations (Labour 
Party, 2020). 
iii  The perception of neutrality was undermined by the fact that shortly after delivering the 
findings of her inquiry she was nominated for a peerage by Corbyn and then her appointment 
as shadow Attorney General (Kogan, 2019: 345).
iv The IHRA definition stated that: ‘antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be 
expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are 
directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish 
community institutions and religious facilities’ (IHRA 2016). 
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